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1 Introduction
The standard assumption in matching models pioneered by Gale and Shapley
(1962) is that agents belonging to one side of the market have preferences
over the agents in the opposite side. However, in many social settings people
care about not only whom they are matched with but also the partners of
the others. That is, in a marriage market a person may prefer to be single if
majority of people in the society is single, but to be married if the majority
is married. In school assignment, parents may prefer to send their kids to a
particular school only if it is mostly populated by kids belonging to a certain
group. In a labor market, firms would be very much interested in what subset
of workers is hired by their competitors or in the case of couples searching
for jobs each mate cares about which firm his/her mate is matched with. In
all these cases, individuals’ preferences depend on the realized matching in
the society, hence are interdependent.
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-
to-one matching problem, and study the existence and properties of stable
matchings. The issue of interdependent preferences has received due attention
from at least three works in matching theory. Echenique and Yenmez (2006)
study the assignment of students to colleges where students have preferences
over the other students who would attend the same college. They introduce
an algorithm that finds all matchings in the core, whenever it is nonempty.
Klaus and Klijn (2005) study the matching in a job market with couples
where individuals do not only care about the firm they are matched with
but also the firm their mates are matched with. They show that a stable
matching exists only when couples’ preferences exhibit weak responsiveness;
i.e., the unilateral improvement of one partner’s job is considered beneficial
for the couple as well.
Definitely, the paper which is closest to ours is by Sasaki and Toda (1996),
who study the same formulation of interdependent preferences in one-to-one
matching problems. However, our model diﬀers from theirs as we allow the
prospect of being single in matchings while their stability notion includes
ours as a special case. Sasaki and Toda (1996) reasonably use the idea of
conjectural equilibrium to define stability which requires a deviating pair to
prefer all members of the set of conjectured matches that are likely to occur
to the current one. They show that the general existence of the stable set can
be guaranteed if and only if the collection of conjectured matchings coincides
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with the set of all conceivable matchings for any agent considering deviation.3
Our stability definition is a natural extension of Gale and Shapley’s sta-
bility notion to the environment with interdependent preferences. We assume
that for any given initial matching the set of conjectured matchings due to
any deviation is always a singleton, consisting of a matching that diﬀers from
the initial one only in the marital status of the deviating agents and their
divorced initial partners, if any.4 We show that with interdependent pref-
erences, the existence of stable matchings cannot be guaranteed. For every
society, there will be a preference profile at which no stable matching exists.
Besides, the stable set does not need to coincide with the core (when they
both exist), except for societies in which either the set of men or the set of
women is a singleton.
Because of a stronger notion of stability and a richer set of possible
matches (allowing for the possibility of staying single) than what are as-
sumed by Sasaki and Toda (1996), our model is not always compatible with
the general existence of equilibrium matchings. Despite this fact, we have
abstained from employing the extreme (weakest) form of Sasaki and Toda’s
stability that requires deviating agents always to worry about the worst case.
In order to see how weak such a notion may indeed be, one can consider the
following analogy bearing in mind the close parallel between Gale and Shap-
ley’s stability (and core) notion in the matching theory and the Nash (and
strong Nash) solution in the non-cooperative game theory, where preferences
over the admissible set of strategies are typically interdependent, which ac-
tually makes a situation a strategic game.5 In a two-person game called as
‘matching pennies’, there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, since
at each strategy pair one agent has an incentive to deviate if the other agent
3An important self-criticism made by Sasaki and Toda (1996) for their own approach
is that the conjectural valuations (expectations) are exogeneously given. Hafalir (2006)
perfects Sasaki and Toda’s model by endogenizing the set of matchings that a deviating
pair considers possible on the preferences of the other agents in the society.
4We use the common jargon of marriage models for convenience.
5This conventional interdependency in game theory must not be confused with inter-
dependency of preferences modeled in many diﬀerent setting in economics, in which an
outcome, whenever defined over the strategies, specifies an allocation for each distinct
player. This formulation allows one to define utility payoﬀs that are interdependent over
the individual allocations. See Pollak (1976), Postlewaite (1998), Ok and Kockesen (2000),
Charness and Rabin (2002), Gul and Pesendorfer (2005), Li (2005), and Sobel (2005) for
a comprehensive examination of this new literature.
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keeps his or her strategy unchanged.6 With a weaker equilibrium concept
requiring each deviating agent to consider all possible reactions of the oppo-
nents, all of the four possible outcomes may arise in equilibrium. Yet, such a
‘productive’ solution concept is hardly recognizable in game theory, for the
induced positive result is entirely illusory. We believe that after choosing a
proper stability notion under interdependent preferences, one should welcome
the ‘annoying’ non-existence of stable matchings with the same composure
that is shown by any game theorist in facing the frequent non-existence of
Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) in many non-cooperative games. How-
ever, we should also admit that the justification of any stable outcome by
rational acts and beliefs of individuals remains to be an essential issue, which
can undoubtedly be studied in isolation.
Acknowledging the possible nonexistence of stable matchings, we give a
suﬃciency result for the existence of a nonempty stable set and a nonempty
core, imposing some restrictions on the preference profiles. We call a proper
subset of all available matchings as a top-matching collection if each element
of which is preferred by any individual in the society to any matching outside
the collection. We say that two machings are unconnected by an agent if he
or she has distinct mates under these two matchings. We then define that a
matching is reachable from another matching by some coalition of individuals
if this coalition contains anyone who unconnects the two matchings. Clearly,
a top-matching collection, whenever singleton, is equal to the core of the
associated marriage market, and is contained by the stable set. Moreover,
a non-singleton top-matching collection, where any two of its elements are
unconnected by a coalition of individuals that contains at each of the match-
ings either a married couple or a single individual opposing to the formation
of the other matching, is equal to the core, associated with the preference
profile that induces this top-matching collection. We are able to relax this
suﬃciency condition in an existence result for the stable set, where one has
to deal with only blocking coalitions of size not exceeding two.
In this study, we also show that for any society with a nonempty core,
the Pareto set has to coincide with neither the stable set nor the core, unlike
in the case of independent preferences. While all stable matchings are Pareto
optimal in any society where one of the genders has a unique representative,
6The game is played between two players. Each player shows either heads or tails from
a coin. If both are heads or both are tails then player one receives one dollar from player
two, otherwise player two wins one dollar from player one.
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the stable set and the Pareto set may in general have an empty intersection.
Another finding of ours is that the properties of stable and core matchings
with respect to gender-optimality under independent preferences cannot be
replicated for a society with interdependent preferences. There may exist
gender-optimal stable matchings that are not in the core as a direct result of
the non-equivalence of the stable set and the core. Moreover, the existence
of men-optimal stable and men-optimal core matchings does not guarantee
the existence of women-optimal stable and women-optimal core matchings.
Furthermore, even when the core is non-empty, there may exist neither a
gender-optimal stable matching nor a gender-optimal core matching. As
opposed to the case with independent preferences, the common preferences of
the two sides of the market are not always opposed on the core. Consequently,
the set of people who are matched may not be the same for all core matchings.
Besides, the core and the stable set do not always exhibit a lattice structure.
Regarding strategic issues, we show that there are no core mechanisms
that are strategy-proof, replicating the well-known impossibility theorem in
the case of independent preferences. Besides, when a core (stable matching)
mechanism is applied to a marriage market, under certain restrictions of
preferences, there is always at least one agent who wants to misrepresent
his/her preferences. Moreover, the core (stable matching) mechanism is also
prone to successful manipulation by coalitions of men and women.
It is promising for empirical research that the matching model we con-
sider is refutable, since for any society facing at least two diﬀerent matchings
there exists at least one collection of matchings, e.g. the set of all conceivable
matchings, that is not rationalizable either for the stable set or the core. On
the other hand, we also have a suﬃciency result showing that any set con-
taining no pairs of connected matchings is rationalizable for the stable set,
and also rationalizable for the core provided that the number of pairwise un-
connected matchings in this set does not exceed the number of individuals in
the society. However, our refutable matching model of interdependent pref-
erences is not always exactly identifiable, as there may exist many diﬀerent
preference profiles that rationalize some collections of matchings.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
There are two nonempty, finite and disjoint sets of agents: a set of men, M
and a set of women, W . The society is denoted by N =M ∪W . There exist
at least three agents in the society; i.e., |M ||W | ≥ 2. We denote a generic
man by m, a generic woman by w, and a generic agent in the society by i.
A matching is a one-to-one function, μ, from N to itself, such that for
eachm ∈M and for each w ∈W we have μ(m) = w if and only if μ(w) = m,
μ(m) /∈ W implies μ(m) = m, and similarly μ(w) /∈ M implies μ(w) = w.
If μ(m) = w, then m and w are matched to one another. If μ(i) = i, then
i remains single. When denoting a matching μ, we list the mates of men
m1,m2,m3, . . .. For example, μ = w2,m2, w1, . . . denotes a matching where
m1 is matched to w2,m2 to himself, andm3 to w1. Any woman not listed in μ
is single. We denote by μm,w a matching obtained from μ by marryingm and
w after divorcing them from their mates, if any, under μ; i.e., μm,w(m) = w,
μm,w(μ(m)) = μ(m) if μ(m) 6= m, μm,w(μ(w)) = μ(w) if μ(w) 6= w, and
μm,w(i) = μ(i) for all i /∈ {m,w, μ(m), μ(w)}. We denote byMN the set of
all possible matchings in society N .
Each agent has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over
the matchings inMN . Men’s preferences are represented by Pm and women’s
preferences by Pw. The profile of all agents’ preferences is denoted by P =
(P i)i∈N . A marriage market is a triple (M,W,P ). The list of all agents’
preferences excluding the preference of agent i is denoted by P−i. For any
preference profile P , we denote by P i[k] the kth-ranked matching from top
in the preference ordering P i of agent i. We write μ >m μ0 to meanm prefers
μ to μ0, and μ ≥m μ0 to mean m likes μ at least as well as μ0. We also write
μ >M μ0 to denote that all men like μ at least as well as μ0, with at least one
man strictly preferring μ to μ0. We denote by μ ≥M μ0 that either μ >M μ0
or that all men are indiﬀerent between μ and μ0. Similarly, we write μ >w μ0,
μ ≥w μ0, μ >W μ0, and μ ≥W μ0.
In the classical one-to-one matching literature, each individual’s prefer-
ences (Gale and Shapley’s preferences), over the prospect of being single and
the feasible mates of the opposite gender, are independent of the realized
matching in the society. In other words, from the viewpoint of every in-
dividual, the ordering of any two matchings boils down to the ordering of
the corresponding mates achieved at these two matchings. Clearly, Gale and
Shapley’s independent preferences are contained in our space of interdepen-
dent preferences as special cases, whenever we allow for indiﬀerences. In
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what follows, we give some basic definitions.
Definition 1. A matching is acceptable to agent i if
μ ≥i μi,i.
A matching is called unaccaptable to an agent if it is not acceptable to him
or her. We also say that an agent individually blocks matching μ (via μi,i) if
μ is unacceptable to him or her.
Definition 2. A matching is individually rational if it is acceptable to each
agent.
Definition 3. For a given matching μ, (m,w) is a blocking pair if they are
not matched to one another but prefer one another to their matches at μ;
i.e., μ(m) 6= w and
μm,w >m μ and μm,w >w μ.
Definition 4. A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there
are no blocking pairs.
We denote the set of stable matchings (the stable set) for the marriage
market (M,W,P ) by S(M,W,P ).
Definition 5. Amatching μ0 dominates another matching μ via a (blocking)
coalition M 0 ∪W 0 of men and women such that μ0(M 0 ∪W 0) = M 0 ∪W 0,
μ0(μ(m0)) = μ(m0) for any m0 ∈M 0 if μ(m0) /∈W 0 ∪ {m0}, μ0(μ(w0)) = μ(w0)
for any w0 ∈ W 0 if μ(w0) /∈ M 0 ∪ {w0}, μ0(i) = μ(i) for any i /∈ M 0 ∪W 0 ∪
μ(M 0 ∪W 0), and
μ0 >i μ
for all i ∈M 0 ∪W 0.
We assume in the above definition that the members of the blocking
coalition seek marriage within the coalition. Moreover, the previous mate, if
exists, of any agent in the blocking coalition becomes single under the new
matching if he or she is not inside the blocking coalition, while the marital
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status of all other agents are unchanged.
Definition 6. The core, C(M,W,P ), is the set of all matchings dominated
by no other matchings.
For most part of our results in the following section, we will make gener-
alizations from findings obtained for some ‘small’ marriage markets. For that
reason, we will extend the matchings and preference profiles in a convenient
way to keep the marriage relationships in a given society N preserved in a
larger society N˜ ⊃ N .
Definition 7. For any society N , define the extension operator EN as
a function that maps each matching μ ∈ MN to an extended matching
EN [μ] ∈MN˜ as follows:
EN [μ](j) =
½
μ(j) if j ∈ N
j otherwise
Definition 8. Given any marriage market (M,W,P ) associated with the
society N =M ∪W , a new profile P˜ of a larger society N˜ = M˜ ∪ W˜ ⊃ N is
called a society-respecting extension of P if
(i) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |MN |}
P˜ i[k] =
⎧
⎨
⎩
EN [P i[k]] if i ∈ N
EN [Pm[k]] if i ∈ M˜\M
EN [Pw[k]] if i ∈ W˜\W
for some m ∈M and w ∈W ;
(ii) for all μ0 ∈MN˜ , for all i ∈ N˜\N and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |MN |} such
that μ0 6= P˜ i[k] and μ0 6= μ0i,i,
μ0i,i >i μ
0
under the profile P˜ .
The extension described above respects the stable marriages in the initial
society. Condition (i) keeps the preference orderings of the members of the
initial society essentially unchanged while at the same time making all of
the new members entering the society comply with the preferences of one
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of the initial members of the same gender over the set of extended initial
matchings.7 Condition (ii) along with condition (i) ensures that the new
members entering the society will not steal the mates of the former members.
In order to clarify our basic structures and notions, we present two ex-
amples which will also be used in some of our results in the next section.
Example 1. Consider a society N with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2}.
The seven possible matchings are given by
μ1 = w1, w2
μ2 = m1, w2
μ3 = w2,m2
μ4 = m1, w1
μ5 = w2, w1
μ6 = w1,m2
μ7 = m1,m2.
Every single agent under a given matching can induce some other matching
at which he or she is married upon the mutual consent of a prospective
partner. Conversely, every married agent can change (by an individual action
of divorcing his or her mate) the prevailing matching to a one at which he or
she is single. As a third possibility, every married agent can change a given
matching by replacing his or her mate upon the consent of a prospective
partner.
The ability of the agents to change the seven matchings listed above are
illustrated by the directed graphs in Figures 1-4, which will also be useful in
following some of our results in the next section. In these graphs, a circled
k stands for matching μk. The labels d,m and dm on the arrows in the
directed graphs respectively stand for the actions of ‘divorcing’, ‘marrying’,
and ‘divorcing and re-marrying’.
An agent can individually block a matching μk to induce some other
matching μl only if there exists an immediate directed arrow with the label
d from node k to node l in the ability map of this agent. Moreover, a man
and a woman can pairwise block matching μk to induce some other matching
7In condition (i), a new member’s adopting the preference ordering of an individual of
the same gender in the initial society simply aims to preserve the gender polarization, if
exists, in the set of stable matchings, which will be the subject of Theorems 8-10.
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μl only if the ability maps of these two agents both contain an immediate
directed arrow with any of the labels m or dm from node k to node l.
Figure 1: Ability map of m1 Figure 2: Ability map of m2
Figure 3: Ability map of w1 Figure 4: Ability map of w2
Consider the following preferences for the individuals:
Pm1 = μ1μ7μ5μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pm2 = μ1μ5μ7μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pw1 = μ1μ7μ5μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pw2 = μ1μ5μ7μ2μ3μ4μ6
The set of stable matchings S(M,W,P ) is {μ1, μ5, μ7}while the coreC(M,W,
P ) consists of μ1. Although for every individual μ1 dominates μ5 and μ7, all
of the three matchings are stable as the above figures illustrate that any of
the three nodes corresponding to these three (stable) matchings cannot be
reached from the other two nodes by any individual or any pair.
Now, suppose that society N enlarges to N˜ = M˜ ∪W where M˜ = M ∪
{m3}. There are thirteen possible matchings, of which seven can directly be
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obtained by applying the extension operator E onMN as
EN [μk] = μk,m3
for k ∈ {1, ..., 7}. A preference profile P˜ for society N˜ can be obtained using
a society-respecting extension from the profile P . Then, it is easy to check
that S(M˜,W, P˜ ) = S(M,W,P ) and C(M˜,W, P˜ ) = C(M,W,P ).
Example 2. Consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1}. The
three possible matchings are
μ1 = w1m2
μ2 = m1w1
μ3 = m1m2.
Let the preference profile P be given by
Pm1 = μ2μ1μ3
Pm2 = μ1μ2μ3
Pw1 = μ1μ2μ3.
Each man is most happy when the other man is married to the unique
woman in the society. Nevertheless, each man prefers to being married to this
woman to being single. It is easy to check that S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) =
{μ1, μ2}.
3 Results
A well-known theorem by Gale and Shapley (1962) shows the existence of
a stable matching for every marriage market with independent preferences.
This result does not extend to our framework.
Theorem 1. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2, there exists a preference
profile P such that S(M,W,P ) = ∅.
Proof. Consider a society N withM = {m1,m2} andW = {w1}. The three
possible matchings are as listed in Example 2. Let the preference profile be
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given by
Pm1 = μ1μ3μ2
Pm2 = μ3μ2μ1
Pw1 = μ2μ1μ3.
Clearly, no stable matching exists for the above marriage market. By simply
renaming m1,m2, w1 as w1, w2,m1, respectively, in the matchings and the
above preference profile, one can obtain a similar argument for the market
with M = {m1} and W = {w1, w2}. In each case, the result can be gen-
eralized to |M ||W | ≥ 2 as we can extend the preference profile for N to
a new profile P˜ for any larger society N˜ ⊃ N through a society-respecting
extension. Then, one can easily check that any matching μ0 ∈ MN˜ is not
stable (being acceptable to none of the new members) if μ0 6= EN [μi] for some
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, while for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} matching EN [μi] is not stable by our
previous argument.
Since C(M,W,P ) ⊂ S(M,W,P ), a direct corollary of the above theorem
is that the existence of the core cannot be guaranteed, either.
When preferences are independent, the set of stable matchings always
equals the core. We have a similar result with interdependent preferences
when there are only one man or only one woman in the society.
Theorem 2. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} = 1, S(M,W,P ) =
C(M,W,P ) for all P .
Proof. The inclusion C(M,W,P ) ⊂ S(M,W,P ) is true by definition. To
show the converse, suppose first S(M,W,P ) = ∅. Then, S(M,W,P ) ⊂
C(M,W,P ) trivially holds. Next, suppose S(M,W,P ) 6= ∅. For any match-
ing μ ∈MN it is true that either every individual is single or there is only
one married couple. In both situations, the smallest coalition of individu-
als that can block μ contains at most one man and one woman. Therefore,
μ ∈ C(M,W,P ) if μ ∈ S(M,W,P ).
A distinction between the core and the stable set is found by Sasaki
and Toda (1996) in a model with interdependent preferences. However, the
matchings they consider are bijections and the weaker stability notion they
use requires each blocking pair to become better oﬀ under all conjectured
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matchings.8 The following theorem states that the non-equivalence of the
core and stable set also arises in our framework when there are at least two
members from each gender in the society.
Theorem 3. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2, there exists a pref-
erence profile P such that C(M,W,P ) 6= S(M,W,P ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Consider the market described in Example 1. Recall that S(M,W,P )
= {μ1, μ5, μ7} 6= {μ1} = C(M,W,P ). Evidently, the result follows for any
larger market by a society-respecting extension of preferences.
A natural question is whether we can always have a nonempty core or a
nonempty stable set on a restricted domain of preferences.
Definition 9. For any society N with the preference profile P , a nonempty
proper subset V of matchingsMN is called a top-matching collection if for
all i ∈ N , P i[k] ∈ V for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |V|}.
In Example 1, the collections {μ1}, {μ1, μ5, μ7}, {μ1, μ5, μ7, μ2}, {μ1, μ5,
μ7, μ2, μ3}, and {μ1, μ5, μ7, μ2, μ3, μ4} are all top-matching collections. How-
ever, not all of these collections are contained by the stable set or the core.
Definition 10. Given a society N and an agent i ∈ N , two matchings
μ, μ0 ∈MN are called connected by agent i if μ(i) = μ0(i) and unconnected
by agent i otherwise.
Definition 11. Given a society N and a coalition T of agents in N , a
matching μ0 is reachable by T from another matching μ if the set of all in-
dividuals that connect μ to μ0 is N\T . Let R(μ, μ0) denote the coalition by
which μ0 is reachable from μ.
A matching μ can be blocked by a coalition T of individuals via some
other matching μ0 only if T = R(μ, μ0), i.e., the coalition T can reach μ0 from
μ. Clearly, the converse of the statement is not always true, i.e., a coalition
that can reach a matching μ0 from a given matching μ may not be able to
8Sasaki and Toda (1996) obtains this result when the set of conjectured matchings
diﬀers from the set of all conceivable matchings.
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block μ via μ0 if the members of the coalition do not agree upon that μ0 is
superior.
Theorem 4. Let N be a society with the marriage market (M,W,P ) satis-
fying |M ||W | ≥ 2. Suppose N has a top-matching collection V with |V| ≥ 1
such that whenever |V| > 1 it is true that for any μ, μ0 ∈ V, R(μ, μ0) contains
at least one married couple or one unmarried individual under μ, preferring
μ to μ0. Then C(M,W,P ) = V.
Proof. No coalition of individuals can block any matching in V via any
other matching in MN\V, since V is a top-matching collection. Moreover,
no matching in MN\V can be in the core since it can be blocked by the
grand coalition N via any matching in V. Therefore, C(M,W,P ) ⊂ V. It
is obvious that C(M,W,P ) = V if |V| = 1. Suppose |V| ≥ 2. Consider any
two matchings μ, μ0 ∈ V. The matching μ cannnot be blocked by R(μ, μ0)
via μ0, by the assumption that there exists in R(μ, μ0) a married couple or a
single individual under μ, preferring μ to μ0. Since μ and μ0 were arbitrary,
we have V ⊂ C(M,W,P ). Together with C(M,W,P ) ⊂ V, this implies
C(M,W,P ) = V.
Apparently, a singleton top-matching collection, like the set {μ1} in Ex-
ample 1, is equal to the core of the marriage market. In the same example,
one can check that any top-matching collection that contains {μ1, μ5, μ7}
(hence diﬀers from the core) does not satisfy the suﬃciency condition of the
above theorem, since μ1 dominates any other matching for any individual.
One can also verify that the unique top-matching collection {μ1, μ2} in Ex-
ample 2 satisfies the hypothesis in Theorem 4, hence equals the core.
We should notice that the condition in Theorem 4 that a non-singleton
top-matching collection must satisfy in order to be equal to the core of the
market requires the existence of either a married couple or a single individual
resisting against the formation of a potentially capable coalition to change the
current matching. We can surely relax this condition to characterize prefer-
ence profiles that yield a nonempty stable set, inspiring from the observation
that if any two matchings in a top-matching collection are unconnected by
a suﬃciently large number of individuals (e.g. the collection {μ1, μ5, μ7} in
Example 1), then no individual or pair can block any matching in the collec-
tion even in cases it is to the benefit of all individuals to collectively do so.
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Theorem 5. Let N be a society with the marriage market (M,W,P ) satis-
fying |M ||W | ≥ 2. Suppose N has a top-matching collection V with |V| ≥ 1
such that whenever |V| > 1 it is true that for any μ, μ0 ∈ V at least one
of the following is met: i) |R(μ, μ0)| ≤ 4 and R(μ, μ0) contains at least one
married couple or one unmarried individual under μ, preferring μ to μ0; ii)
|R(μ, μ0)| = 4 and individuals in R(μ, μ0) are all married or all single under
any of the two matchings; iii) |R(μ, μ0)| > 4. Then V ⊂ S(M,W,P ).
Proof. No pair or singleton can block any matching in V via any other
matching inMN\V, since V is a top-matching collection. It is obvious that
S(M,W,P ) ⊃ V if |V| = 1. Suppose |V| ≥ 2. Consider any two matchings
μ, μ0 ∈ V that satisfy one of the three conditions in the theorem. First note
that a pair of man and woman can block μ via μ0 only if |R(μ, μ0)| ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
So, if condition (iii) holds, μ cannot be blocked via μ0 by coalitions of size not
exceeding two. The conclusion also remains to be true if condition (ii) holds,
since one needs the approvals of all four individuals in R(μ, μ0) to reach μ0
from μ. Finally, the argument is clear if condition (i) is the case. Thus, we
have S(M,W,P ) ⊃ V.
One can check in Example 1 that the top-matching collection V = {μ1, μ5,
μ7} satisfies condition (ii) (but not the other two conditions) in the above
theorem as for any two matchings μ, μ0 ∈ V, |R(μ, μ0)| = 4, and all agents
are married under μ1 and μ5 while all agents are single under μ7. Hence
V ⊂ S(M,W,P ) becomes true. When min{|M |, |W |} = 1, i.e., one of the
genders has a unique member in the society, a top-matching collection can
only satisfy condition (i) in the above theorem, since any two matchings can
be unconnected by at most three agents. We simply observe that condition
(i) is met in Example 2 by the unique top-matching collection {μ1, μ2} that
has already been checked to satisfy a similar hypothesis in Theorem 4.
Now, we shall consider the relationship between the notions of optimality
and stability.
Definition 12. For a given marriage market (M,W,P ), a matching μ is
Pareto optimal if there is no μ0 such that
μ0 >i μ
for all i ∈ N . Let PO(M,W,P ) denote the set of all Pareto optimal match-
ings (the Pareto set).
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When preferences are independent, any stable matching is also Pareto
optimal. But, with interdependent preferences, the stable set and the core
diﬀer from the Pareto set as stated by the next theorem.
Theorem 6. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2, there exists a preference
profile P such that C(M,W,P ) 6= ∅, and
PO(M,W,P ) 6= S(M,W,P ) and PO(M,W,P ) 6= C(M,W,P ).
Proof. First consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1}. The
three possible matchings are as defined in Example 2. Let the preference
profile P be given by
Pm1 = μ3μ1μ2
Pm2 = μ1μ3μ2
Pw1 = μ1μ3μ2.
Clearly, S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {μ3}whereas PO(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ3}.
The result symmetrically obtains for a society with M = {m1} and W =
{w1, w2}, by changing the identities m1,m2, w1 with w1, w2,m1 respectively
in Example 2. In each case, the result simply generalizes to any larger society
by a society-respecting extension of preferences.
A similar result as to the distinction between the stable set and the Pareto
set is reported by Sasaki and Toda (1996). For societies involving only one
agent in one side of the market, we have an immediate Corollary to Theorem
2 stating the optimality of every stable matching.
Corollary 1. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} = 1, S(M,W,P ) ⊂
PO(M,W,P ) for all P .
The above result follows from the obvious fact that the core is always
contained by the Pareto set. However, the converse is not always true as
implied by Theorem 6. Indeed, the relation between the stable set and the
Pareto set is even weaker. Below, we will show that for societies involving at
least two members from each gender a nonempty stable set does not always
include a Pareto optimal matching. This result is in contrast with Sasaki
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and Toda (1996) proving that in a model with interdependent preferences
and bijective matchings there always exists a stable matching that is Pareto
optimal.
Theorem 7. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2, there exists a prefer-
ence profile P such that S(M,W,P ) 6= ∅ and PO(M,W,P )∩S(M,W,P ) = ∅.
Proof. Consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2}. The
seven possible matchings are as defined in Example 1. Consider the prefer-
ence profile given by
Pm1 = μ3μ1μ4μ5μ2μ6μ7
Pm2 = μ1μ4μ5μ2μ3μ6μ7
Pw1 = μ1μ4μ5μ2μ3μ6μ7
Pw2 = μ3μ1μ4μ5μ2μ6μ7.
One can easily check that S(M,W,P ) = {μ4}, (C(M,W,P ) = ∅) and
PO(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ3}. The result immediately follows for any larger
society by a society-respecting extension of preferences.
Now, we turn our attention to stable matchings that are optimal for one
side of the marriage market.
Definition 13. For a given marriage market (M,W,P ), a stable matching
μ is M-optimal if every man likes it at least as well as any other stable
matching; i.e.,
μ ≥M μ0
for every other stable matching μ0. Similarly, a stable matching ν is W -
optimal if every woman likes it at least as well as any other stable matching;
i.e.,
ν ≥W ν0
for every other stable matching ν 0. Let μM and μW denote M-optimal sta-
ble matching and W -optimal stable matching, respectively. By applying the
above definition on the core matchings, one can similarly define M-optimal
core matching μM,C and W -optimal core matching μW,C .
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Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that when all men and women have strict
independent preferences, there always exist an M-optimal stable matching
and a W -optimal stable matching. Moreover, μM,C = μM and μW,C = μW
since the stable set always equals the core.
In our case, where preferences are interdependent, the core does not need
to coincide with the stable set; therefore for a given gender (men or women)
the optimal matchings over the stable set and the core (whenever they are
nonempty) may not be the same. Besides, their existence are not guaranteed,
either.
Theorem 8. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2 there exists a preference
profile P such that C(M,W,P ) 6= ∅ and either (μM , μM,C) do not exist or
(μW , μW,C) do not exist.
Proof. Consider the marriage market described in Example 2. We have
S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ2}. Obviously, μW = μW,C = μ1 while
μM and μM,C do not exist. By simply renaming m1,m2, w1 as w1, w2,m1,
respectively, in the matchings and the preference profile in Example 2, we
can show that for a society with M = {m1} and W = {w1, w2}, we have
μM = μM,C = μ1 while μW and μW,C do not exist. Both results follow for
any larger society using a society-respecting extension of preferences.
In fact, one can further show that for societies containing at least two men
and two women, there are preference profiles at which neither M-optimal
matching nor W -optimal matching exists in the stable set and in the core.
Theorem 9. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2, there exists a pref-
erence profile P such that C(M,W,P ) 6= ∅ and none of μM , μW , μM,C , and
μW,C exists.
Proof. Consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2}. The
seven possible matchings are as defined in Example 1 and the preference
profile is given by
Pm1 = μ7μ1μ5μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pm2 = μ1μ5μ7μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pw1 = μ7μ5μ1μ2μ3μ4μ6
Pw2 = μ1μ5μ7μ2μ3μ4μ6.
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It is easy to check that S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ5, μ7} while none
of μM , μW , μM,C , and μW,C exists. The result immediately follows for any
larger society using a society-respecting extension of preferences.
A theorem by Knuth (1976) states that when all agents have strict inde-
pendent preferences, the common preferences of the two sides of the market
are opposed on the set of stable matchings: if μ and μ0 are stable matchings,
then all men like μ at least as well as μ0 if and only if all women like μ0 at
least as well as μ. That is, μ >M μ0 if and only if μ0 >W μ. But, with inter-
dependent preferences this result does not prevail any longer for matchings
either in the stable set or in the core.
Theorem 10. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2, there exists a preference
profile P and some μ, μ0 ∈ C(M,W,P ) such that μ >M μ0 is not true while
μ0 >W μ.
Proof. Consider the marriage market described in Example 2. Recall
that C(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ2}. We have μ1 >W μ2 while it is not true that
μ2 >M μ1. The result immediately follows for any larger market using a
society-respecting extension of preferences.
Apparently, Theorem 10 can symmetrically be restated by interchanging
men and women. For markets with strict independent preferences, a theorem
(McVitie and Wilson 1970, Roth 1984) benefiting from the opposition of the
common preferences of the two sides of the market proposes that the set of
people who are matched is the same for all stable matchings. For strict and
interdependent preferences, a similar statement is no longer true.
Theorem 11. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2, there exists a preference
profile P such that there are at least two matchings in the core at which the
set of people who are matched is not the same.
Proof. Consider the society described in Example 2. The unique mar-
ried pair is (m1, w1) at the core matching μ1 whereas (m2, w1) at the core
matching μ2. The result immediately follows for any larger society using a
society-respecting extension of preferences.
The above negative result holding for the core trivially applies for the sta-
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ble set, as well. Next, we study whether the stable set or the core, whenever
nonempty, has an algebraic structure, called lattice. We borrow the following
definition from Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
Definition 14. A lattice is a partially ordered set L any two of whose ele-
ments x and y have a “sup”, denoted by x∨y and an “inf”, denoted by x∧y.9
For any two matchings μ and μ0, and for all men, define μ∨M μ0 (join) as
the function that assigns each man to his mate at the most preferred of the
two matchings, and μ∧M μ0 (meet) as the function that assigns each man to
his mate at the least preferred of the two matchings:
μ ∨M μ0(m) =
½
μ(m) if μ >m μ0
μ0(m) otherwise
and
μ ∧M μ0(m) =
½
μ0(m) if μ >m μ0
μ(m) otherwise
for all m ∈M . Define μ ∨W μ0 and μ ∧W μ0 analogously.
The well-known lattice theorem (Conway) states that when all preferences
are strict and independent, the set of stable matchings is a (distributive) lat-
tice under the common preference order of the men, dual to the common
preference order of the women. When preferences are interdependent, the
core (hence the stable set) does not always have a lattice structure with re-
spect to the common ordering of men or women.
Theorem 12. For any society with |M ||W | ≥ 2 and for any X ∈ {M,W},
there exists a preference profile P such that there are two matchings μ, μ0 ∈
C(M,W,P ) for which the functions μ∨X μ0 and μ∧X μ0 are not stable match-
ings.
Proof. Consider first the society described in Example 2. For the two core
matchings μ1 and μ2, μ1∨M μ2 is not a stable matching since μ1∨M μ2(m1) =
m1 and μ1 ∨M μ2(m2) = m2. On the other hand, μ1 ∧M μ2 is not a matching
since μ1 ∧M μ2(m1) = w1 and μ1 ∧M μ2(m2) = w1 are contradictory. Now
9A binary relation is a partial order if it is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. An
order relation R is transitive if xRy and yRz implies xRz; reflexive if xRx; antisymmetric
if xRy and yRx implies x = y.
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consider a society with M = m1 and W = {w1, w2}. Let the associated
matchings and the preference profile be obtained by changing the identi-
ties m1,m2, w1 with w1, w2,m1 respectively in Example 2. The core remains
to contain μ1 and μ2, and it is obvious from our previous arguments that
μ1∨W μ2 and μ1∧W μ2 are not stable matchings. The result immediately fol-
lows for any larger society with min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2 using a society-respecting
extension of preferences.
Now, we turn to some strategic issues. Specifically, we shall study the
extent to which agents will be sincere about their preferences for possible
matchings. Consider a marriage market where the matching of individuals
is determined by a centralized clearinghouse, based on a list of preferences
that individuals state. A mechanism, Γ, is a procedure which determines
a matching for each marriage market (M,W,P ). If the list of preferences
reported by the individuals is Q, the mechanism produces a matching Γ[Q].
If Γ[Q] is always stable with respect to Q, the mechanism Γ is said to be
a stable matching mechanism. Moreover, if Γ[Q] is always in the core with
respect to Q, the mechanism Γ is said to be a core mechanism.
Definition 15. A mechanism Γ is strategy-proof if for all P and for every
i ∈ N ,
Γ[P ] ≥i Γ[Pˆ i, P−i]
for all Pˆ i.
In his seminal paper, Roth (1982) shows that when preferences are strict
and independent, there is no stable matching mechanism (core mechanism)
which is strategy-proof. The impossibility to design a mechanism that pro-
duces core matchings or stable matchings in terms of the reported preferences
and that makes the truthful reporting a dominant strategy for every agent,
remains to exist when preferences are interdependent, as well.
Theorem 13. For any society satisfying |M ||W | ≥ 2 and having strict and
interdependent preferences, there is no core mechanism which is strategy-
proof.
Proof. Consider the marriage market decribed in Example 2. We have
C(M,W,P ) = {μ1, μ2}. So, any stable mechanism must choose μ1 or μ2
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when the preference report is P . Suppose the mechanism chooses μ1. If
m1 misreports his preference ordering as Qm1 = μ2μ3μ1 while everyone else
makes truthful revelations, then at the reported profile (Qm1 , Pm2, Pw1), μ2
becomes the unique matching in the core, which is preferred by m1 to μ1 at
his true preferences Pm1. So, it is not a dominant strategy for all agents to
truthfully reveal their preferences. Similarly, if the mechanism chooses μ2
when the preferences P are reported, then m2 can profitably misrepresent
his preferences as Qm2 = μ1μ3μ2 to force the mechanism to select his more
preferred core matching μ1. The result immediately follows for any larger
society using a society-respecting extension of preferences.
The below result, which strengthens our impossibility theorem, charac-
terizes some restrictions on preferences under which at least one agent will
behave strategically when facing a core mechanism. Obviously, both this
result and the previous one hold for stable matching mechanisms, as well.
Theorem 14. Consider any marriage market in which preferences are strict
and interdependent, and assume that (i) there is more than one stable match-
ing in the core and every agent is married at any core matching, (ii) every
matching outside the core in which at least one pair is married is unacceptable
to at least one agent, and (iii) the matching at which every agent is single is
bottom ranked by at least two agents. When any core mechanism is applied
to this market, then at least one agent can profitably misrepresent his or her
preferences, assuming the others tell the truth.
Proof. Consider a marriage market (M,W,P ) satisfying the hypotheses of
the theorem. Let the core of this market, C(M,W,P ), contain at least two
stable matchings by assumption. Suppose that when all agents reveal their
true preferences, the core mechanism Γ selects matching ν. Let i be any
agent who does not top rank ν in his or her preference ordering. There exists
such an agent, for otherwise no matching other than ν could be in the core.
Find l = min{r |P i[r] ∈ C(M,W,P )}, the index of the core matching that
agent i prefers most. It must be true that μi,i 6= μ for any μ ∈ C(M,W,P )
since i is not single under any core matching, by assumption (i). Now, let i
misrepresent his or her preferences as Pˆ i by top-ranking P i[l] while ranking
μi,i above μ for any other μ ∈ C(M,W,P ), and keeping the position of the
bottom-ranked element of P i as the same in Pˆ i. Let other agents truthfully
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represent their preferences. Denote the new profile by Pˆ = (Pˆ i, P−i). Then,
no matching μ ∈ C(M,W,P )\{P i[l]} can be in C(M,W, Pˆ ), since any such
matching is unacceptable to agent i under Pˆ i, by construction. Let μs denote
the matching under which every agent is single. Any μ /∈ C(M,W,P )∪{μs}
cannot be in C(M,W, Pˆ ) as it is unacceptable to at least one agent, by as-
sumption (ii). Finally, μs /∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ) since there is at least one pair ready
to block it, by assumption (iii). Hence, Γ(Pˆ ) = C(M,W, Pˆ ) = {P i[r]}, which
makes agent i better-oﬀ.
A result by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1987) shows that when pref-
erences are strict and independent no coalition of men and women can ma-
nipulate their preferences so successfully that every member of the coalition
prefers one of the new outcomes to every stable outcome (with respect to the
true preferences). Below, we prove that such limits on successful manipula-
tion do not exist when preferences are interdependent.
Theorem 15. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2, there exist two
preference profiles P and P¯ , where P¯ diﬀers from P for some coalition C of
men and women, such that there exists a matching μ in the core (stable set)
for P¯ , which is preferred to every core (stable) matching under the preference
P by all members of C.
Proof. Consider a society with M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2}. The
seven possible matchings are as defined in Example 1 and the preference
profile is given by
Pm1 = μ3μ1μ4μ5μ2μ6μ7
Pm2 = μ1μ4μ5μ2μ3μ6μ7
Pw1 = μ1μ4μ5μ2μ3μ6μ7
Pw2 = μ3μ4μ1μ5μ2μ6μ7.
It is easy to check that S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {μ4}. Now suppose
that the singleton coalition {m1} misrepresents his preference ordering as
P¯m1 = μ1μ3μ4μ5μ2μ6μ7.
Define P¯ = (P¯m1, P−m1). We then have S(M,W, P¯ ) = C(M,W, P¯ ) =
{μ1, μ4}. Clearly, m1 prefers μ1 ∈ C(M,W, P¯ ) to μ4, the unique match-
ing in C(M,W,P ). The result immediately follows for any larger society
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using a society-respecting extension of preferences.
When one of the genders has a unique representative in the society, we
have a weaker result.
Theorem 16. For any society with min{|M |, |W |} = 1, there exist two
preference profiles P and P¯ , where P¯ diﬀers from P for some coalition C of
men and women, such that there exists a matching μ in the core (stable set)
for P¯ , which is weakly preferred to every core (stable) matching under the
preference P by all members of C.
Proof. The proof is obvious from the proof of Theorem 13, which shows the
existence of a preference profile under which one of the agents in the society
can successfully manipulate his or her preference to make the mechanism
outcome uniquely select his most preferred core matching.
So far, we have dealt with whether the set of stable matchings and the
core for any given society have to exist, whether they must coincide when-
ever they both exist, and whether they satisfy some desirable properties such
as optimality, gender optimality, and strategy proofness or have some useful
structures, such as lattices. Now we shall try to get beyond these tradition-
ally investigated aspects of any meaningful matching model, by asking an
interesting existential question that has very recently been raised and an-
swered by Echenique (2006) in the framework of independent preferences:
“Can there be any set of matchings for a given society that is incompatible
with the predictions of our matching model with respect to the employed
stability notions?" As Echenique (2006) points out the answer to this ques-
tion is important when the preferences are unknown as it allows one to know
whether a matching theory at hand has testable implications. Following his
treatment, we define the rationalizability of any set of admissible matchings
for the stable set and for the core.
Definition 16. For a given society N = M ∪W , let H ⊂MN be a subset
of available matchings. We say that H is rationalizable for the stable set if
there exists a preference profile P such that H ⊂ S(M,W,P ). Similarly, we
say that H is rationalizable for the core if there exists a preference profile P
such that H ⊂ C(M,W,P ).
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We simply note that a set H ⊂ MN is rationalizable for the core only
if it is rationalizable for the stable set. Echenique (2006) shows that under
independent preferencesMN is not rationalizable for the stable set (equalling
the core) if the number of men and the number of women are the same and
at least three. We extend this result in the following way.
Theorem 17. For any society N satisfying |M ||W | ≥ 2 and having strict
and interdependent preferences, MN is not rationalizable for the stable set
(and the core).
Proof. Suppose, MN is rationalizable for the stable set by some prefer-
ence profile P ; i.e.,MN ⊂ S(M,W,P ). Let μs denote the matching at which
every agent is single. Pick any (m,w) ∈M×W . Denote by μsm,w the match-
ing at which (m,w) is the unique married couple. Then, μsm,w >m μs and
μsm,w >w μs by the assumed stability of μsm,w. This implies that μs cannot be
in S(M,W,P ), a contradiction.
Theorem 17 shows that the whole set of matchings cannot be rational-
izable, hence our matching model is testable. Given the refutability of our
model, the next step is to check whether any proper subset ofMN can be
rationalizable. When the preferences are independent, Echenique (2006) is
able to show that any set of matchings in which no agent is matched with
the same partner under diﬀerent matchings is rationalizable. He also shows
that in general the preferences that rationalize a rationalizable set of match-
ings are not unique. The existence of rationalizable collection of matchings
must not be suprising in our framework either, given the positive results of
Theorems 4 and 5 that characterize certain restrictions on preferences that
yield a nonempty core or a nonempty stable set for a given marriage market.
However, as the complete characterization of rationalizable sets is beyond
the scope of this paper, we will here present a simple suﬃciency theorem.
Theorem 18. For any society N having strict and interdependent prefer-
ences, consider H ⊂ MN such that no pair of matchings μk, μl ∈ H are
connected by any agent in N . Then H is rationalizable for the stable set and
there exist at least ¡|H|!(|MN |− |H|)!¢N
distinct preference profiles that rationalize it; moreover if |H| ≤ N , then H
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is rationalizable for the core and there exist at leastµ
N
|H|
¶
|H|! (|H|!)(N−|H|) ¡(|MN |− |H|)!¢N
distinct preference profiles that rationalize it.
Proof. Consider any societyN having strict and interdependent preferences.
Pick any H = {μ0, μ1, μ2, . . . , μZ} ⊂MN for some Z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |MN |− 2}
such that no pair of matchings μk, μl ∈ H are connected by any agent in N .
Consider first the preference profile P such that for all i ∈ N , P i[k] = μk−1 for
all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |H|}. Then, it is easy to check that H ⊂ S(M,W,P ). Each
individual inN can independently order the first k matchings in |H|! distinct
ways while he or she can order the remaining matchings in (|MN | − |H|)!
distinct ways. Hence follows the lower bound on the number of preferences
that rationalizeH for the stable set. To prove the second part of the theorem,
let |H| ≤ N . Enumerate agents from 1 to N . Consider the preference profile
P such that P i[k] = μl with l = (k + i− 2) mod |H| for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |H|}
and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |H|} whereas P i[k] ∈ H for all i ∈ {|H|+1, . . . , N}
and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |H|} with each P i[k] being distinct. Then, it is
easy to check that H ⊂ C(M,W,P ). Notice that there are ¡ N|H|¢ distinct
ways to select |H| agents from the society. The first |H| matchings in the
preference orderings of the first |H| agents are completely tied to each other,
so there are |H|! distinct ways to represent their preference ordering as a
group. Each of the remaining N − |H| agent can independently have any of
|H|! distinct orderings of the first |H|matchings drawn fromH. Besides, any
agent in N can independently order the remaining (|MN |− |H|) matchings
in (|MN |− |H|)! distinct ways.
In Example 2, the sets H1 = {μ1}, H2 = {μ2}, H3 = {μ3}, and H4 =
{μ1, μ2} all satisfy the connectedness hypothesis in the above theorem. Since,
|Hk| ≤ 3 = N for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, any Hk is rationalizable for the core
(hence for the stable set). Moreover, one can easily calculate that the set
H1, contained by the core, can be rationalized for the stable set by at least 8
distinct preference profiles and for the core by at least 24 distinct preference
profiles.
Theorem 18 shows that if a collection of matchings, such as the set of all
matchings, is not rationalizable for the stable set (or the core even when the
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number of matchings in the collection is less than the number of agents in the
society), then some agents must have the same mate under more than one
matching. We should here emphasize that this result simply characterizes
collections of matchings that are not rationalizable, However, a suﬃciency
result such as Theorem 18 is still valuable, as already remarked by Echenique
(2006) in his framework of independent preferences, since it has an important
implication for empirical tests of the matching theory at hand, requiring
some pairs of agents to be identified under more than one matching in the
available data. On the other hand, Theorem 18 also implies that our refutable
matching model of interdependent preferences is not exactly identifiable, as
there may exist many diﬀerent preference profiles that rationalize some sets
of matchings.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce interdependent pereferences to a classical one-to-
one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single and study
the existence and properties of stable matchings. The results that we obtain
in this paper, along with some previous findings of Sasaki and Toda (1996) for
the case of bijective matchings, clearly demonstrate that the tools and results
of the classical theory of matching, built under the assumption of independent
preferences, may be of little use in models involving externalities. In fact,
this observation implies that one should be extremely careful in applying the
classical theory to solve some real matching problems. The assumption of
independent preferences, which can harmlessly be made in designing a market
for kidney exchange, may, on the other hand, be extremely inappropriate
in modeling marriage and divorce in a given society, the school choices of
families for their kids or the firm choices of couple workers.
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